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Thus, microeconomic studies are needed to gain some perspective on the differences between domestic and international remittances. Microeconomic studies using household survey data could also provide insight into how remittances can absorb negative income shocks, particularly to low-income rural and urban households-a somewhat different shock-absorbing quality than balance of payments deterioration. 6 Remittances can help prevent severe fluctuations in household income, and hence, in household consumption. This socalled "insurance role" of remittances takes on added importance in national policy-making in a post-global financial crisis era when increasing attention is being paid to consumption-rather than export-led growth. Likewise, in emerging economies such as Vietnam where social security policies are in the process of being developed, the extent to which public transfers might replace or "crowd out" transfers via remittances would also assume policy significance.
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"Crowding out" is more likely to occur when remittances are motivated by altruism, but they may not occur at all when the profit or exchange motive dominates. 8 This study therefore examines in some detail the motivations behind remittances in Vietnamese households. The study primarily uses data from the three Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS) for , , and . 9 In these surveys, remittances are defined as " [t] he amount of money and monetary value of in-kind benefits received by a household that do not require repayment." 10 While each of the three surveys clearly distinguishes whether the remittances received by each household were sourced domestically or internationally, they did not collect information on senders. Therefore, the analysis was conducted from the viewpoint of the recipients, the implicit assumption being that the economic and demographic characteristics of the senders do not affect the remittance amounts. However, this study uses detailed information on the geographic source of remittances as well as some additional data on the characteristics of migrants, where appropriate, to interpret the results and alleviate the shortcomings of the VHLSS surveys. Unless otherwise noted, our calculations use sample weights to make the data representative of the entire Vietnamese population, both in urban and rural areas, and across different regions. Section  provides some general data about remittances in Vietnamese households. Section  takes a closer look at altruism, exchange motives and the "insurance role" of remittances. Section  analyzes the issue of social safety nets "crowding out" private remittances. Finally, section  stresses the need to take certain factors into account in the design of Vietnam's social policies. As Vietnam begins to develop its social policies, targeting those most in need within an overall budgetary constraint is an important consideration. Hence, as much as possible, social safety nets should build upon existing private transfers within families, supplemented by public transfers where necessary and appropriate.
Remittances in Vietnamese Households
By , more than  percent of all Vietnamese households received some form of remittances, an increase from about  percent in  in both rural and urban areas (see Table  ). By far the largest numbers of households were recipients of domestically sourced remittances, with international remittances accounting for around . percent of rural households and  percent of urban households in .
Not only are remittances prevalent amongst Vietnamese households, they are also an important source of income, constituting around  percent of pretransfer income (income before remittances but after receipt of public transfers) of rural households and up to  percent of pre-transfer income of urban households (see Table  ). 11 Furthermore, because internationally sourced remittances are of a very high value, they become particularly important to the - percent of households in rural areas that receive them, constituting  percent of those households' pre-transfer incomes in . 12 For the  percent of urban households that receive internationally sourced remittances, these constituted around  percent of their pre-transfer income in . Domestically sourced remittances, while received by a much larger portion of households, are less dominant (although still important) in household incomes, constituting around - percent of pre-transfer incomes in both the rural and urban areas.
In the absence of demographic and other personal information on the senders, one can initially infer altruism and exchange motives by observing the relationship between remittances and the pre-transfer income distribution of the recipient households. 13 Supplementary data on the characteristics of the migrants substantiate these inferences.
Figures a and b show that both rural and urban households in the lowest quintile of income distribution receive the largest share of both kinds of remittances-more than  percent of total domestic remittances and more than  percent of total international remittances. These shares fall sharply for the second income quintile, remain more or less unchanged for the third quintile, and then reverse to an increasing trend for the two highest quintiles. This is consistent with the altruism motive for both kinds of remittances for the lower income groups, as the remittances are presumed to be for the purposes of poverty alleviation. Since wealthy families have greater access to investment opportunities, remittances sent to these families are presumed to be for investment on behalf of the senders (that is, for the profit/exchange motive).
Evidence of the altruistic motive in remittances is further supported by the fact that Vietnamese migrants are generally young. The majority of domestic migrants have a median age of  years and most international migrants tend to leave the country between the ages of  and . 14 Given the cultural practice of supporting aging parents, it would seem credible that young people migrating for economic reasons (the most common scenario Furthermore, migrants are generally found to be more educated and better trained in elementary technical and/or business skills than non-migrants.
In particular, workers leaving for overseas employment were able to move from doing mostly manual work in the s to jobs requiring semi-skilled and skilled labor by . It is also likely that these better-educated young workers sent funds back to their families for investment in Vietnam's booming equities and housing market in -. the urban ratio was . and the rural ratio was .. This is not surprising given the very large monetary value of international remittances and the fact that households in the cities are much more likely to have members that go abroad for work. The high value of remittances to urban households partly accounts for their much higher living standards.
Like Table  , Tables  and  show the same ratios of remittances to population but break them down into eight geographical regions. The tables further classify these ratios according to low-and high-income groups in each region. Table  shows the situation in rural areas, and Table  concentrates on the cities. Table  shows that for rural households living in the southeast (encompassing Hồ Chí Minh City), the Red River Delta (encompassing Hà Nội), and the Mekong River Delta, the ratios are at least one and often higher than one.
These households therefore receive a disproportionately higher share of remittances. In particular, it can be seen that the ratios for the rural poor in these three regions range from . to ., indicating that the rural poor living near the big cities of Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh as well as in the Mekong River Delta do particularly well from remittances. As for the high-income households in rural areas, only those in the southeast (near Hồ Chí Minh City) seem to receive disproportionately larger remittances. For urban households both rich and poor, only those in the southeast (near Hồ Chí Minh City) seem to receive disproportionately larger remittances (see Table ) .
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Table  also shows the ratios of remittances to population but classified them according to whether the household receives social security income, such as a pension, or whether the household has borrowings. As in the earlier tables, the information is broken down into rural and urban areas. The following observations can be made from Table  . First, regardless of whether a household is urban or rural, if it has borrowings, it receives a disproportionately smaller share of remittances, as the ratios are all below one. Second, both rural and urban poor households receive less remittances than rich households when they have borrowings; that is, access to household credit is likely to reduce remittances by a larger-than-proportionate amount for the poor than it does for the rich. The ratios for poor households are consistently less than the ratios for rich households. This could be due to the fact that borrowings by poor households are generally for consumption expenditures, and such borrowings could replace remittances sent with altruistic motives. Rich households, on the other hand, would generally access credit for investment purposes. Third, access to credit is likely to reduce remittances more for the urban poor than for the rural poor. The ratios for the urban poor are consistently lower than those for the rural poor. Fourth, no clear substitution effects can be seen in Table  between pensions and social welfare income and remittances. The table reveals no consistent pattern of ratios. It is suggested that household characteristics need to be controlled before such a relationship can be observed. This is done in section  through econometric analysis, which measures the extent to which social security payments, in ,  and , reduce private remittances if household characteristics are held constant. Indeed, we observed pensions and social welfare payments replacing or "crowding out" private transfers through remittances after taking into account household characteristics (see section ). whether the household is in the countryside or the city, the ratios are larger than one for households that are more vulnerable-that is, households with sick members, with the household head living away from home, with only one household head through death, divorce or separation, and with an elderly head of household. Such vulnerable households receive a disproportionately larger share of remittances. Furthermore, the ratios are substantially larger than one for households with heads living away from home. This would indicate cases where the father or mother leaves home to work either in the city or overseas and send funds back to support the family.
In the subsequent sections, we examine the data using econometric analyses in order to better control for household characteristics when examining the altruistic and exchange motives behind sending remittances and the "crowding out" effect of public transfers.
A Closer Look at Altruism, Exchange Motives, and the "Insurance Role" of Remittances
As the previous section pointed out, one can examine altruism and exchange motives by looking at the relationship between a household's pre-transfer income and the amount of remittances it receives. At the same time, a number of other factors need to be controlled as they have independent impacts on remittances. These include whether the remittances come from an international or domestic source; whether the household is located in a city or a rural area; in which of the eight regions of Vietnam the household is located; whether the household receives a social security income, a pension, or some form of loan; and whether a household is vulnerable as defined by certain household characteristics. We therefore use regression analysis to examine the relationship between household pre-transfer incomes and remittances received, after controlling for the above-mentioned factors (for a summary of the regression analysis, see Appendix A). Furthermore, we employ nonlinear regression techniques as the relationship is expected to be negative for low-income households (altruism motive: as household incomes increase, remittances for the purposes of poverty alleviation fall) and positive for high-income households, but these remittances increase at a reducing rate (profit/exchange motive: as households become wealthier, investment opportunities rise and more remittances are sent for the purposes of making profits on behalf of the senders). Table  summarizes the estimated change in remittances for a  percent change in household incomes in the year  (see Appendix A for calculations for this year as well as for  and ). The results are generally consistent throughout the three survey years.
This table shows that amongst rural poor with an average household income of . million VNĐ in , for every  percent fall in household income there were estimated increases of , VNĐ from domestic remittances and , VNĐ from international remittances. Likewise, in the case of urban poor with an average household income of . million VNĐ, for every  percent fall in income there were estimated increases of , VNĐ in domestic remittances and , million VNĐ in international remittances. These estimates clearly indicate significant altruistic motives in sending remittances. However, the surprisingly high estimate of remittance increase to the urban poor is somewhat puzzling. One explanation could lie in the fact that when rural incomes fall, people resort to subsistence farming to supplement their consumption-an avenue that is not open to the urban poor. Hence, a fall in income amongst the urban poor could signify a proportionately much larger reduction in consumption, and therefore induce a greater increase in remittances both domestic and international, as a further indication of altruism.
Table  also shows that for the rural and urban rich, remittances increase when household incomes rise. This is consistent with indications of the profit or exchange motive. This relationship is quantitatively larger for international remittances. However, compared with the international remittances to the urban poor in response to a fall in household income, remittances to the urban rich for profit (exchange motive) seem surprisingly small, particularly in light of anecdotal evidence that a great deal of international remittances went into the real estate and stock market boom during -. This could also indicate a bias towards underreporting of remittances on the part of the wealthier households in these surveys.
Given the very clear altruistic motive in both remittances sent to the rural and urban poor, together with some indications that disproportionately large amounts of remittances go to vulnerable households, it seems reasonable to conclude that remittances in Vietnam could well act as a form of insurance, enabling poor households to maintain their consumption when disasters strike. In this context, it is useful to take a closer look at government social safety nets and how they may affect and interact with private remittances.
"Crowding Out" of Private Remittances by Public Transfers and Access to Credit
In section , we established the altruistic motive behind remittances-that there is definitely a negative relationship between household pre-transfer income and remittances to both the rural and urban poor. As such, the issue of public transfers crowding out private remittances arises at least in principle.
(Note that household pre-transfer income is defined as household incomes before remittances but after public transfers where relevant.) In other words, if increases in public transfers, in the form of social security payments and pensions, raise the income of the poor households, then private remittances are likely to be reduced by the amounts estimated in section . In addition, for any given amount of public transfer, the extent of the crowding out could be even larger if the household was to move from a situation of not receiving public transfers (probably due to lack of a social security system) to a situation of receiving them. One reason for this could be that in the eyes of the altruistic individual sending the remittances, the household has moved from being predominantly dependant on remittances to a situation where it has a "guaranteed" income from the government. We explore the crowding out issue using regression analysis, which controls for the region in which the household is located as well as the household characteristics. The results are presented in Table  . Table  shows that for both rural and urban households throughout the three surveys, the impact of public transfers (social welfare income and pensions) on the amount of remittances received are consistently negative and statistically significant. In fact, in , for a low-income household in the countryside already receiving public transfers, an increase of these transfers by, say, , VNĐ would result in a net increase of household income by only around , VNĐ. This would be the case because the , VNĐ of public transfer would reduce private remittances by an estimated , VNĐ. 16 On the other hand, if there were no existing public transfers and a new social welfare system was introduced so that the household is to be given public transfers for the first time to the tune of , VNĐ, then Table  shows that this would further reduce domestic remittances by , VNĐ and international remittances by , VNĐ. In this example, international remittances would be reduced in total by , VNĐ. Hence, for international remittances at least, it would appear that the crowding out issue is a serious one.
These results do not argue against the institution of social welfare payments per se, but they do indicate that the design of such programs needs to take into account the offsetting effect they may have on private remittances. Further, the very large negative and statistically significant coefficients on household borrowings in Table  strongly point to credit as a substitute for remittances. Additionally, with the coefficients doubling and tripling in urban areas compared with rural areas, these results indicate that access to credit is likely to reduce remittances much more for the urban poor than the rural poor. Again, these results do not in themselves argue against programs such as microfinance that give the poor access to credit. They do, however, indicate that the design of such programs should be cognizant of the role of private remittances and what effect these initiatives would have on them.
Conclusions
We have shown that a very large proportion of Vietnamese households received remittances in - and that these remittances constituted a significant share of household incomes. The majority of households received remittances from within Vietnam, but for those able to access remittances from abroad the amounts were much larger than domestically-sourced remittances.
In general, remittances do seem to play an "insurance role" for the poor, cushioning any sudden falls in household incomes. In particular, the seemingly altruistic motive behind the sending of remittances from abroad appears to be very strong with respect to the poor living in the cities. As for the rural poor, those who live close to the big cities of Hà Nội, Hồ Chí Minh City, and the Mekong River Delta received higher amounts of remittances than those living in more remote areas.
We have also demonstrated that public transfers tend to crowd out private remittances. The effect was more severe in cases where the household did not previously receive public transfers. The reason could be that for an altruistic family member sending funds back home to, say, elderly parents, the change in the parent's status from being reliant on remittances to having some form of "guaranteed income" from the government could have a onceoff negative impact on the amount of remittances the family member sends. In addition, we found that access to credit for low-income households acts as a substitute for remittances. The crowding out and substitution effects are by no means complete, and do not necessarily argue against the institution of social security payments or access to credit for the poor. Rather, they indicate that the design of any such schemes needs to take into account the significant role that remittances play in the household incomes of the poor.
Finally, there is some indication that amongst high-income households, remittances are sent for investment or exchange motives. However, the quantitative estimates appear relatively small. This could be due to underreporting on the part of wealthy households. Further research-first by comparing the survey data on international remittances with balance of payments data, and second by including data on migrant characteristics-is needed. , VNĐ (. million × % × .). The altruistic motive is quite clear in both cases, and quantitatively more prominent in the case of international remittances.
Table A. also shows that for high-income rural households, the response of both domestic and international remittances to increases in income is consistently positive over the three survey periods and statistically significant.
In order to capture the nonlinear nature of the response, a variable calculated as income-squared is used.
18 This variable shows a consistently negative coefficient for both domestic and international remittances. This means that for high-income rural households, as their incomes increase, both domestic and international remittances also increase but at a decreasing rate. This is much more prominent in international remittances. In general, amongst the high-income rural households, a  percentage increase in an average income of . million VNĐ in  results in an increase of , VNĐ in international remittances, but only  VNĐ in domestic remittance.
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Both domestic and international remittances also exhibit altruistic motives towards the urban poor, as shown in percentage fall in an average household income of . million VNĐ would have resulted in an increase in domestic remittances of , VNĐ (. million × % × .), and in international remittances of , VNĐ (. million × % × .). At least in , people sending funds back to Vietnam from abroad seemed to have been much more generous towards the poor in the cities than towards those in the countryside. Part of this surprisingly large generosity could be explained by the fact that subsistence farming is not available to the urban poor. Hence, the fall in consumption due to a  percent reduction in income would be much more severe for the urban poor compared with the rural poor.
Similar to high-income households in the countryside, Table A . shows that rich households in the cities tend to receive increasing amounts of remittances as incomes increase. Indeed, for a  percent increase in an average income of  million VNĐ amongst the urban rich in , it is estimated that the household would have received , VNĐ in international remittances, but only  VNĐ in domestic remittances. 20 This is consistent with the observation that a large amount of international remittances was channelled into the booming real estate and stock markets at that time, whichindicates the profit or exchange motive behind the sending of remittances.
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By analyzing data from the three Vietnam Household Living Standards
Surveys between  and , the authors found that a very large proportion of Vietnamese households received remittances during those years and that these remittances constituted a significant share of household incomes. The majority of households received remittances from within Vietnam, but for those able to access remittances from abroad, the amounts were very much larger.
In general, remittances do seem to play an "insurance role" for the poor, cushioning any sudden falls in household incomes. There is also some evidence that public transfers can crowd out private remittances, but the effect is by no means complete.
Notes
